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Recent theoretical analysis of contract default rules has devoted signifi-
cant attention to the use of penalty default rules as a way to induce a con-
tractor to reveal private information. Penalty default rules demonstrate how
efficient rules cannot be derived by simply asking what most parties would
have contracted for had they written a complete contract. Such "majori-
tarian" default rules derive from an implicit assumption about the reason why
a particular contract is incomplete. A fuller efficiency analysis tries to un-
derstand the reasons why contracts are incomplete and how different default
rules affect the efficiency of the contracting process and the contracts them-
selves. Our goal here is to show how an understanding of the underlying
causes of contractual incompleteness informs the optimal choice of default
rules.
Barry Adler's fine article' correctly identifies a new reason why it may
be difficult to use "penalty" or "information-forcing" defaults to induce con-
tractors to reveal private information about their personal attributes (what
game-theorists tend to call their "type"). In an earlier article, 2 we had shown
that, when one side to a contract has private information and the other side
has market power, the privately informed party may be reluctant to contract
around a penalty default (and thereby reveal information) if doing so would
allow the other side to extract more of the gains from trade.3 But Adler has
shown that even when the private information and the market power are on
the same side of the contract-as when a privately informed buyer contracts
in a market with competitive sellers-the privately informed party may still
be reluctant to contract around a penalty default.4 In our earlier model, the
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1. See Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1547 (1999).
2. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992).
3. In particular, we showed in a stylized version of Hadley that buyers who would experience
uncharacteristically high potential damages from a seller might be reluctant to reveal this informa-
tion if sellers had market power and might use the information about the buyer's value to charge a
supracompetitive price. See id. at 738-41. Our model was an attempt to formalize some of the
insights of Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract De-
fault Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990).
4. See generally Adler, supra note 1.
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informed buyer was reluctant to contract around the penalty defaults because
doing so would subject her to a supracompetitive price; in Adler's model, the
informed party is reluctant to contract around penalty defaults because doing
so would destroy the subsidized pricing that the privately informed party re-
ceives by hiding out in the undifferentiated pool.
Adler should be credited for identifying this additional reason why pri-
vately informed parties may be reluctant to contract around default rules.
But showing that it may be harder to induce information revelation with a
particular type of penalty default is not an argument in favor of setting "hy-
pothetical" or "majoritarian" defaults. Efficiency gap filling should grow out
of one's substantive theory of why particular contracts are incomplete. Ad-
ler's insight actually strengthens an implication of our earlier articles: The
effect of a particular default rule on information revelation, and thus on effi-
ciency, depends on numerous characteristics of the contracting environment
that are independent of the "hypothetical contracting" inquiry-that is,
merely assessing what the parties would have contracted for if there were no
private information. Other factors, including the distribution of types, the
magnitude of transaction costs, and the distribution of bargaining power, will
all affect the likelihood that a particular penalty default will induce separa-
tion and enhance efficiency. Adler adds another factor to this list-the pos-
sibility that revealing information might eliminate an informed party's sub-
sidy from pooling. Even these results underestimate the problem of predict-
ing outcomes since they were derived in overly simplistic and unrealistic
models of contract negotiations whose purpose was merely to show the pos-
sibility that penalty defaults could be efficient.
Majoritarian theories of default choice are implicitly derived from a
transaction cost based theory of incomplete contracts. But when contracts
are strategically incomplete because of one side's private information, then
there is no reason to think that majoritarian or hypothetical default setting
will conduce to efficiency. When transaction costs are low and contracts are
incomplete because of private information, the potential welfare losses from
choosing an inefficient default are largely independent of transaction costs
and, as we have previously shown, can dwarf the mere out-of-pocket costs of
contracting around.5
The normative implication of Adler's analysis is not that policymakers
should reflexively retreat to majoritarian defaults, but instead the message is
that "life is hard." When contracts are incomplete because of a contractor's
private information about her "type," it will be difficult for efficiency-
minded lawmakers to identify the efficient default.6 Penalty defaults at times
5. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 762.
6. As we argued earlier,
relatively simple contractual settings can give rise to enormous complexity. While we can
show that different default rules--and in certain circumstances, immutable rules-would be
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will still be efficient,7 but Adler shows there is a narrower range of circum-
stances where information-forcing rules will produce efficient separation
making it difficult for lawmakers to determine when they will be effective.
Adler's analysis, however, is only about one type of minoritarian rule-a
penalty default set to cause information about contractor's type.8 In this
comment, we develop a simple model that identifies four other rationales for
minoritarian rules based on
(1) different private costs of contracting around,
(2) different private costs of failing to contract around,
(3) different public costs of filling gaps, and
(4) ignorance of the law.
The choice of an efficient default does not boil down merely to a choice be-
tween the majoritarian rule (for which most contractors would have con-
tracted) and a penalty default designed to induce a contractor to reveal in-
formation about her type. Instead, efficiency-minded lawmakers will often
need to consider the other four factors to decide whether it is more efficient
to choose a default that only a minority values.
In our original article,9 we intended to use the possibility of penalty de-
faults as a particularly vivid example of why the efficiency-maximizing law
might at times diverge from majoritarian gapfilling. We were not the first to
see that certain defaults-the Hadley default in particular-could induce
contracting that revealed information, 10 but we were the first to see that pen-
alty defaults were inconsistent with the then dominant theory of choosing
gapfillers that minimized the need of private parties to contract around."
theoretically efficient, our model suggests that there is small hope that lawmakers will be
able to divine the efficient rule in practice.
Id. at 733.
7. Adler admits this as well. See Adler, supra note 1, at 1582 (noting that penalty defaults
still "could be efficient").
8. See id. at 1549.
9. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic The-
ory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
10. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis
of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1299-1300 (1980); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 114 (3d ed. 1988); William Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Eco-
nomics of Insurance, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 241,253 (1983).
11. Lucian Bebchuk and Steven Shavell had independently written an unpublished manuscript
with a similar model of Hadley that came to our attention literally on the last day of editing the
galleys of our original article (even though we had previously delivered our article at Chicago,
Georgetown, Michigan, Northwestern, and Illinois law schools). Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven
Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Bax-
endale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991). While their mathematical model is similar, their manu-
script at that time did not relate Hadley to the then accepted ("majoritarian" or "hypothetical") theo-
ries of default choice. Their article did, however, go further than our article in identifying the par-
ticular parameter values for which the limited-liability default would be efficient. Our article only
emphasized the possibility that the Hadley default might be efficient for certain parameter values.
See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9, at 112 ("If inequality (9) holds ... ,then the costs of
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Information-forcing defaults try to induce explicit contracting that might
have been avoided with the use of alternative defaults. But there are other
rationales besides "information forcing" that might justify setting nonma-
joritarian gapfillers.
I. RATIONALES FOR MINORITARIAN RULES
In an earlier article, we sketched a simple model of default choice.12 In
this section, we extend the model to show not only when majoritarian rules
will be efficient, but also to show a variety of reasons why minoritarian rules
might be superior.13 Imagine that a policymaker is choosing between two
different defaults: "one" and "two." Imagine that for i equal to 1 or 2:
al = the percentage of the population of contracting parties that, in a world
without private information, would prefer to use default i;
Pi = the percentage of type i contracting parties who, in equilibrium, would ex-
pressly contract for rule i if the other rule were the default;
ci = the private costs of expressly "contracting" for rule i;
fi = the inefficiency generated if a type i contracting party "fails" to expressly
contract for rule i when the other rule is the default;
14
ei = the expected "externalized" public cost of filling the gap for a type i con-
tracting party who fails to expressly contract around default rule i.
15
pooling exceed the costs of separating, and the Hadley default is efficient even though it is not what
the high-damage millers would have wanted."). In order to overthrow the academic consensus that
defaults should mimic what the parties would have contracted for, it was sufficient for our purposes
to show that a "penalty" default might be efficient for some plausible parameter values.
12. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9, at 113-15.
13. If it were costless to negotiate and draft contractual provisions describing the contracting
obligations for every conceivable future contingency (that is what game-theorists would call every
possible "state of the world"), then we would not expect to see obligational gaps in contracts. Con-
tracting costs are the primary if not sole reason for obligation incompleteness. Private information
might still cause these obligationally complete contracts to be insufficiently state contingent, be-
cause one privately informed contractor might be reluctant to reveal material information to the
other side, but private information by itself would not provide a reason why the parties would not
fill obligational gaps. Indeed, the possibility that one party might be mistaken about the law in a
world with costless contracting would induce the parties to contract to duplicate the default obliga-
tions that would obtain in the absence of the explicit provisions.
14. As suggested in the standard Hadley model, some of the inefficiency of pooling equilibria
may stem from inefficient precaution taken with respect to those parties who nonstrategically re-
main in the pool. However, as Adler has nicely emphasized, the size of this inefficiency will often
be a function of the percentage of high-cost types that choose to hide strategically in the low-cost
pool. Thus, even though expression (1), see text accompanying notes 15-16 infra, measures the
costs of failing to contract as being tied to the percentage of disfavored contracting types who fail to
contract around (a2 - 032), some of the inefficiency of disfavored types failing to contract around
may be visited on the favored contracting types (a,) who fail to expressly contract.
15. As will be discussed at text accompanying notes 18-20 infra, courts may expend more re-
sources determining how to implement certain types of defaults than others. The expected size of
this external gapfilling cost (e,) will turn on, among other things, how frequently the court vill be
called upon to fill the gap as well as on the substance of the particular default. For example, setting
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These five variables can be used to assess the private and public cost of par-
ticular defaults. For example, the costs associated with default one will be:
c232 +f2(2 - P2) + el(1 - P2). (1)
A corresponding expression exists for the costs associated with default two.16
This expression captures the private costs of contracting (c 2 P2), the private
costs of failing to contract (f2 (a 2 - P2)), and the public costs of filling gaps
(el (1 - P2)). One could imagine more complicated models where there were
also public costs of interpreting express contracts, or where some type i con-
tractors would expressly contract for i even when the default rule was i, but
these assumptions are sufficient to generate a wide variety of minoritarian
rationales.' 7 In this simpler model, efficiency-minded lawmakers would
choose the default that produced the lowest expected social costs. Compar-
ing the expression in (1) to the corresponding expression for the costs of de-
fault two, it is possible to deduce that default one will only be efficient if:
> f2 +e(1-A)-e 2(1-A)+/82 (c2 -f 2 )-A(cl -A) (2)
A + f 2
The complexity of the right-hand side sharply distinguishes this model from
naive majoritarianism which would suggest that rule one is the efficient de-
fault if a, > .5. However, in a world without private information, even this
relatively complex model will often simplify to something much closer to a
majoritarian analysis. Without private information, this model predicts ex-
treme equilibria where either all or none of the disfavored type would con-
tract around the governing default. For example, if rule one were the default,
type two contractors would all contract expressly for rule two when c2 <f2-
so that in equilibrium P2 = a 2. Or in the alternative, when c 2 >f2, the model
would predict that none of the type two contractors would contract around so
that 02 = 0. Majoritarianism can fare well at either extreme. When 3i = aj,
then simplifying the inequality (2), we can see that default one is efficient if:
the default quantity of a contract to zero would require relatively few resources, while filling a con-
tractual gap with the "reasonable" quantity that the parties would have contracted for would un-
doubtedly be more costly.
16. The model can also be generalized to accommodate the choice among multiple potential
defaults. See Ayers & Gertner, supra note 12, at 116 n.124.
17. In more complicated models, parties might also mistakenly contract away from their pre-
ferred rule.
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(C2 - e2 )(c 1 - el) + (C2 - e2 ) (3)
As long as the private costs of contracting around and the external public
costs of filling gaps are approximately the same, this inequality simplifies to
the majoritarian default-setting criterion. Conversely, in a world without
private information where costs of contracting preclude anyone from con-
tracting around a default so that 03i = 0, then inequality (2) simplifies to:
(f 2 +e, -e 2 )
(A + f 2 ()
If the external public costs of filling gaps and the costs of failing to contract
around a disfavored default are approximately the same, inequality (4) also
reduces to the majoritarian criterion (i.e., choose default one if a, > .5).
Yet, even in a world without private information, the foregoing inequali-
ties provide a number of reasons why efficiency-minded lawmakers might
prefer a default that only a minority of the parties prefer.
A. Different Public Costs of Gapfilling
Even though most models of gapfilling have not focused on the public
costs of filling gaps, default provisions that are standards will often be more
expensive to implement than default provisions that are rules. 18 Courts, for
example, in filling a price gap currently need to expend judicial resources to
determine what the "reasonable" price would have been. Particularly in a
world where parties do not bear the full social cost of public litigation, courts
may want to choose a default that avoids expensive public gapfilling costs.
The long tradition of refusing to enforce contracts that are excessively vague
is consistent with this norm. 19 Courts avoid the effort of filling speculative
gaps, and instead supply a low cost default of nonenforcement. Instead of
filling the quantity gap with the reasonable quantity, which is relatively
costly to calculate, courts choose a zero-quantity default that is relatively
18. See Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1993); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DuKE L.J. 557 (1992).
19. See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1977) (establishing that a contract fails for indefiniteness if there
is not "a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy').
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cheap to implement in terms of court expenditures. 20 Particularly where the
costs of contracting around a default are lower than the expected costs of ex
post judicial gapfilling (c, < el), courts may decide that it is preferable to set
a default that only a minority of parties prefer.
For example, imagine the following stylized choice between two quan-
tity defaults (for written contracts that fail to specify a quantity) where a
lawmaker is to choose between setting a "reasonable" quantity default and a
zero-quantity default. To commensurate this example with the foregoing
model, imagine that the cost of contracting for an express quantity is one, but
the costs of having the court calculate a reasonable quantity ex post is five
(while the court can costlessly implement a zero-quantity default). Assume
that none of the contracting parties substantively prefer trading a zero-
quantity (after all, why go to the trouble of negotiating a contract for a zero-
quantity). And in the shadow of a "reasonable" quantity default, assume that
eighty percent of the contracting parties contract for an explicit quantity,21
while in the shadow of a zero-quantity default assume that all contractors
will expressly state the quantity desired. These assumptions suggest that the
costs of a reasonable quantity default will be eighty percent greater than the
cost of a zero-quantity default.22 The zero-quantity default represents an ex-
treme minoritarian rule. Even though none of the parties drafting written
contracts want a quantity of zero, the zero-quantity default can promote effi-
ciency because it reduces the expected external costs of gapfilling. The
model suggests that ceteris paribus, efficiency-minded lawmakers should
tend to favor defaults that impose lower costs of public gapfilling. Moreo-
ver, the model provides some guidance on when efficiency-minded lawmak-
ers will choose to fill gaps with what the parties would have bargained for,
and when they will refuse to expend the resources to determine what a "rea-
sonable" provision would be and instead conclude that the contract is unen-
forceably void for vagueness. When the expected cost of judicially calcu-
lating the reasonable term is great compared to the costs of private gapfilling,
20. The most current proposed revision to UCC article 2 changes this default by replacing
courts to fill quantifies gaps with reasonable amounts. See U.C.C. § 2-201(a) (Revised Draft Feb. 1,
1999) ("A record is not incomplete merely because it omits a term including a quantity term.").
21. In a more reductive model, none of the parties would contract for an explicit quantity be-
cause they could avoid the transaction costs of express contracting and free-ride on the courts' ex
post quantity determination. However, if courts only imperfectly fill the gap with the quantity that
the parties would have wanted, one can easily imagine contractors finding it in their interest to con-
tract around "reasonable" gap fillers. We see just this phenomena with regard to price, where the
default rule is the reasonable price. In this example, all that is necessary is that more people ex-
pressly contract for a quantity in the shadow of a zero-quantity default than a reasonable quantity
default.
22. Under a zero-quantity default, 100% of the contractors will incur a contracting cost of
one. Under a reasonable quantity default, 80% of the contractors will incur a contracting cost of
one and 20% of the contractors will fail to contract, creating a public implementation costs of
five-causing an expected cost per contract of 1.8 (.8(l) + .2(5) = 1.8, which is 80% greater than
I(I) = 1).
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courts will be more likely to void the contract for vagueness; when the ex-
pected cost of judicially calculating the reasonable term is relatively small
compared to the costs of private gapfilling, courts will be more likely to pro-
vide the "reasonable" term. As we have previously written with regard to the
different legal treatment of price and quantity defaults,
[i]t is not systematically easier for parties to figure out the quantity than the
price ex ante, but it is systematically harder for courts to figure out the quantity
than the price ex post. To estimate a reasonable price, courts can largely rely on
market information of the type "How much were rutabagas selling for on July
3?" But to estimate a reasonable quantity, courts would need to undertake a
more costly analysis of the individual litigants of the type "How much did the
buyer and the seller value the marginal rutabagas?" 23
The relatively high judicial cost of calculating how the parties would have
filled certain obligational gaps can justify the common law impulse to void
certain contracts for vagueness-even though the parties did not intend for
them to be voided. Differences in the costs of public gapfilling (differences
in ei) can therefore justify the use of minoritarian defaults.
B. Different External Effects
The costs of public gapfilling (the ei) are negative externalities of failing
to contract. To the extent that contractors do not pay the full cost of public
litigation, they will not take these costs into account in deciding whether to
contract around a gapfilling rule. But failing to contract around certain de-
faults may create other types of externalities as well that might be either
positive (i.e., welfare enhancing) or negative (welfare decreasing). The e
variable of the foregoing model can be more generally interpreted as the ex-
ternality effect of failing to contract around the default i.24
Externalities are important because the costs of express contracting often
make defaults "sticky." More parties will be covered by a rule if we make
that rule a default than will be covered by that rule if we make a different
rule the default. No one has ever suggested that, in equilibrium, more people
would affirmatively opt for a given rule ("X') if some other rule was the de-
fault than would be covered by rule X by remaining silent if cx was the de-
fault. The number of people who fail to contract around a given default is
always greater than the number ofpeople who would affirmatively contract
for the substantive provision in the shadow of some other rule. 5 This is the
iron law of default inertia. A normative implication of inertia is that effi-
ciency-minded lawmakers should tend to prefer defaults that produce posi-
23. Ayers & Gertner, supra note 12, at 96.
24. When the external effect is welfare enhancing, e will be negative; when the external ef-
fect is welfare reducing, ei will be a positive cost (as was the case with the judicial costs of gapfill-
ing).
25. In terms of our model, this inertia effect implies that 01 will never be greater than a,.
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tive externalities because, by making such rules the default, we will increase
the number of contractots in equilibrium who are covered by the desired rule.
Ceteris paribus, the model suggests the unsurprising result that defaults
that produce positive externalities should be favored while defaults that pro-
duce negative externalities should be disfavored. This normative implication
is consistent with at least one strand of our common law tradition which em-
ploys a similar default canon of construction for resolving contractual ambi-
guities.26 For example, section 207 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
ordains that "[i]n choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise...
a meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred. ' 27 And a
similar public-regarding canon of construction has been proposed and fitfully
applied with regard to statutory interpretation. 28
Failing to contract around a rule might create positive or negative exter-
nalities for other contractors who fail to contract around. In models with pri-
vate information, failing to contract around can create a "pooling equilib-
rium" in which, for example, the failure of bad types to contract around pro-
duces a negative externality on good types who fail to contract around.
Failing to contract around a default can also produce a positive externality by
giving rise to a richer set of precedent and trade usage under the default.
Failing to contract around may also create externalities for third parties
who are not engaging in similar types of contracting. For example, Richard
Epstein has argued that there should not be an immutable rule against race
discrimination in employment. 29 Even if we accepted Epstein's thesis
(which we do not), we would prefer an opt-out default regime (in which
there was Title VII liability for employment discrimination unless expressly
disclaimed) to an opt-in default regime, because there is a positive external-
ity to reducing the spheres of life in which racial discrimination is tolerated.
Because of inertia, it is clear that fewer employers would have the freedom
to discriminate in an opt-out regime than in an opt-in regime.
While the presence of positive or negative externalities at times militates
toward mandatory (or immutable) rules which restrict the parties' abilities to
contract around, there will be circumstances in which blanket prohibitions
create sufficiently deleterious reactions by private contractors. Sometimes,
the best we can hope for is to channel some percentage of contractors away
from a disfavored practice. Favoring defaults which promote positive exter-
26. Chamy has shown that rules of contractual interpretation are fundamentally defaults. See
David Chamy, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89
MICH. L. REv. 1815 (1991).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 207 (1979).
28. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
29. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 17 (1992).
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nalities (or which avoid negative externalities) is an important way for poli-
cymakers to accommodate this intermediate mission.
C. Different Private Costs of Gapfilling
The foregoing model also teaches that differences in the private costs of
express contracting-i.e., differences in c,---can justify the use of minori-
tarian defaults. Ceteris paribus, the model suggests favoring defaults with
higher costs of express contracting. Even if the only costs of default choice
were the costs of express contracting, efficiency-minded lawmakers should
not try to minimize the number of contractors who are induced to contract,
but rather the total costs of express contracting (which will equal the number
of parties who expressly contract multiplied by the per contract costs of ex-
press contracting). A majoritarian default may not be efficient if the costs of
contracting around the majoritarian rule are systematically higher than the
costs of contracting around a minoritarian default. In terms of the foregoing
inequality (3), even when a majority of contractors favor default one
(a, > .5), default two may be efficient if the costs of contracting expressly
for rule two are higher than the cost of contracting for rule one (c2 > c,). 30
Appreciating differences in the costs of contracting might justify the cur-
rent muddy defaults concerning managers' duty of care to their corporation
instead of the relatively crystalline default of no potential managerial liability
(an alternative which can be affirmatively contracted for in Delaware).3 '
Even if a majority of corporations prefer abolishing the managerial duty of
care-and a majority of large corporations affirmatively contract for such
treatment in Delaware 32-it might be efficient to maintain the current muddy
default of potential liability because of differences in contracting costs. As
one of us has argued,
[i]n simple terms, it may be cheaper for corporations to contract for crystals
than mud. If the default rule involves courts in muddy ex post balancing of the
activity's costs and benefits, corporations that prefer unconditional rules (that
unconditionally either allow or prohibit particular management behavior) can
cheaply contract for them. In contrast, if the default rule unconditionally allows
or unconditionally prohibits that behavior, it will be much more difficult for the
parties to contract for a muddy rule which asks courts to make contractual obli-
gations fully contingent on future states of the world.
Corporations desirous of muddy ex post determinations could cheaply in-
sert ex ante muddy provision that allow managers to engage in an activity when
it is "reasonable" or... when it is "in shareholders' interest." However, forc-
ing even a minority of corporations to opt for this kind of language is likely to
30. David Chamy has independently noted this point. See Chamy, supra note 26, at 1849.
31. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
32. See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard
in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1, 62 (1985).
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be less efficient than starting with a muddy (ex post conditioning) default and
forcing a majority of corporations to contract for an unconditional provision.
Because the ex ante formulations of reasonableness by individual corporations
can take so many different forms, there is a much smaller likelihood of devel-
oping a coherent (and therefore valuable) precedential base.33
Ceteris paribus, efficiency-minded lawmakers might tend to favor standards
over rules because parties may have higher costs contracting for effective
state-contingent standards. 34
A similar analysis might suggest that our current reorganiza-
tion/bankruptcy regime might be a more efficient default than a simpler,
more rule-like default such as liquidation and absolute priority. It is easy to
devise a regime for parties to contract for absolute priority or liquidation
upon default,35 but not so easy to contract for the current reorganization rules
or the standard-like deviations from absolute priority. Even if a majority of
debt contracts prefer absolute priority and/or liquidation treatment,36 setting
an alternative default might economize on transaction costs.
It is important to stress that there will often be a trade-off between fa-
voring defaults that avoid high costs of express contracting and favoring
rules that avoid high costs of public gapfilling. Previously, we criticized us-
ing "reasonableness" standards as defaults because they might impose exces-
sively high costs of public gapfilling,37 but as argued here, standards often
have the advantage of imposing lower costs of private contracting. What
33. Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fis-
chel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1405 (1992); see also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path
Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior, and Cognitive Biases,
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996) (arguing that standardization is a form of path dependence in corpo-
rate contracts); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (Or, "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REv. 713, 738 (1997) (explaining
how an underwriter convinces a firm to commit to boilerplate terminology); Mark A. Lemley &
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479 (1998).
34. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 608 (1998). At a minimum, lawmakers may want to provide a menu of choices that are biased
to include standard-like options so that coherent precedents can form around particular options.
35. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories ofAmerican Corporate Bankruptcy,
45 STAN. L. REv. 311, 314 (1993) (explaining that bankruptcy law replaces creditors' rights to act
individually within a collective regime); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political
and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 544, 551-62 (1990) (maintaining that mandatory
corporate law is trivial because it does not prevent companies from establishing their own rules of
governance).
36. Firms may desire a regime other than absolute priority. For example, if equity receives
some value in reorganization, it will have a credible threat to file for bankruptcy that it would not
have under an absolute priority regime. This threat may induce creditors to lend additional funds to
keep the firm operating which in turn can mitigate problems ofunderinvestment caused by financial
distress and multiple creditors. Although creditors will demand higher initial interest rates to com-
pensate for the deviation from absolute priority, the overall value to the firm may be positive. See
Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law,
46 J. FIN. 1189 (1991).
37. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
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should a lawmaker do when confronted with a choice between one default
that has low costs of both public implementation and express contracting,
and another default which has relatively high costs of both public imple-
mentation and express contracting? Inequality (3) shows how these two ef-
fects should be traded off when all contracting types will contract around
disfavored defaults for their preferred rule (i.e., under the assumption that
Pi = a). Minoritarian standards-which impose high public gapfllling
costs---can still be efficient defaults. It is important to note that the costs of
public gapfilling are only incurred when there is a dispute. If disputes are
relatively unlikely, so that parties are likely to agree on a "reasonable" price,
then public gapfilling may provide a benefit for parties attempting to negoti-
ate the ex post reasonable price.38
D. Different Propensity to Contract Around
As noted above, contractual models without private information tend to
produce knife-edged results in which either all of the disfavored contractual
types contract around a default or none do. Contractual equilibria in which
all of the disfavored types expressly contract (j3 = ai) are fully "separating"
because different contracting types enter into separate types of contracting.
Contractual equilibria in which none of the disfavored types contract around
(Pi = 0) are fully pooling, because the different contracting types pool on the
undifferentiated default provision.
But, in richer models, partial pooling (also referred to as partial separa-
tion) equilibria are also possible. In our model, partial pooling is designated
by equilibria in which a, > i > 0. Private information in particular can cre-
ate different propensities to pool or separate.3 9 Using our nomenclature, type
two contractors would have a high propensity to contract around default one
if 1302 rose close to the level of at2. In contrast, type two contractors would
have a low propensity to contract around default one if P2 fell closer to 0.
When different contracting types have different propensities to contract
around dispreferred defaults, our model suggests that ceteris paribus law-
38. For example, assume that the cost of contracting expressly for the business judgement rule
(bjr) standard of care is 10 while the cost of contracting for an absolute liability waiver (1w) of any
duty of care is 1. And assume that the respective public costs of filling the gap for the business
judgement standard and the waiver default in any ensuing litigation are 50 and 5 respectively. Fi-
nally, assume that the probability of ensuing litigation is 5% under the bjr default, but only 1% in
contracts that have waived potential liability. The expected public costs of gapfilling under the two
regimes will be the product of the litigation costs times the probability of litigation, which in this
example yields ebjr = 2.5 and el, = .05. Applying these assumed values to inequality (3) suggests
that the relatively vague standard of care will be the more efficient default even if as few as 12% of
the contractors prefer the standard to the rule.
39. Intermediate propensities to pool could be caused in models without private information
if, for example, contractors of a particular type faced different costs of expressly contracting.
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makers should tend to favor as defaults the preferred rules of contractors who
have a relatively low propensity to contract around other defaults. In the
nomenclature of our model, this means favoring defaults with low 3s. When
failing to contract around a default creates greater public and private costs
than express contracting (e.g.,] + et > ci), then choosing defaults with low Ps
tends to limit the number of parties who fail to contract. By definition, the
other contracting types that disprefer the chosen default will have a higher
propensity to contract around it and produce a more separating equilibrium.
Contractors' private information about the law provides an important
reason why different contracting types may have different propensities to
contract around different defaults. Knowledge about the employment-at-will
default provides a useful example. Pauline Kim has recently published evi-
dence indicating that employees may be systematically misinformed about
the extent of their rights if they and their employers fail to opt out of the em-
ployment-at-will default.40 In particular, Kim shows that, when the employ-
ment contract is silent, employees are likely to mistakenly believe that em-
ployers may only fire them for just cause.41 It is much more likely that em-
ployers, as repeat players, will be correctly informed about the "sound of
silence"--that is, the default meaning of silence.42 When one party to the
contract has a systematic misbelief that a default is more favorable to them
than it is in fact, we are likely to see a low propensity to contract around the
default.
Because employees apparently are systematically optimistic (in believing
that silence entitles them to just-cause protection compared to the superior
knowledge of employers), we can expect that an employment-at-will contract
will produce a lower propensity to contract around. Even though some pro-
portion of contractors may be jointly better off with just-cause coverage,
these just-cause types may fail to contract around the employment-at-will
default. The employees mistakenly believe that they are contracting for just-
cause protection, and the employers who know otherwise will be reluctant to
raise the issue (and thereby reduce the employer's legal rights). 43 In contrast,
we should expect a relatively high propensity of employment-at-will types to
contract around a just-cause default. The employers, as repeat players, will
know that just-cause treatment will result if the contract is silent and will
affirmatively move to contract around what, by assumption, is an inefficient
term with regard to this subset of employment relationships.
40. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Percep-
tions ofLegal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997).
41. See id. at 133-43.
42. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REv. 821, 822 (1992).
43. Indeed, in such a regime employees believe that they are contracting for just-cause pro-
tection may be willing to make wage concessions.
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Imagine that some employment relationships are more efficient as em-
ployment-at-will (possibly because employers' ongoing reputational con-
cerns are a more efficient way to deter firing for bad reasons than submitting
this aspect of the relationship to the vagaries of jury review) but that other
employment relationships are more efficient if employers can only fire for
just cause (possibly because it is a declining industry with fewer prospective
reputational concerns). We can again apply the simple algebra of the origi-
nal model to show that a just-cause default might be efficient even if only a
minority of employment relationships are efficiently governed by such a
standard. To focus on the propensity to contract around different rules, as-
sume that the costs of expressly contracting (c), failing to contract (fi), and
public gapfilling (e) do not vary across rules. Specifically, we assume that
el = c2 = 1,fi =f2 = 5, and el = e2 = 0. To capture the different propensity of
contracting types to contract around dispreferred defaults, we assume that all
of the at-will types (aw) will contract around a just-cause default (Paw = Cw),
but that only fifty percent of the just-cause types (jc) will contract around an
employment-at-will default ([3j, =.5ocjc).
Under these assumptions, it is possible to show that just cause will be the
efficient default even if only twenty-six percent of contractors substantively
prefer just-cause provisions. And as the propensity of just-cause types to
contract around employment-at-will falls, this minoritarian bias increases.
For example, if only ten percent of the just-cause contractors succeeded in
contracting around an employment-at-will default, then efficiency-minded
lawmakers should prefer a just-cause default even if only eighteen percent of
employment contractors substantively preferred just-cause provisions.44
E. Different Costs of Failing to Contract Around
Finally, our basic model suggests that when different contracting types
experience different levels of inefficiency from failing to contract for their
preferred provisions, then efficiency-minded courts will be attuned to the
44. If we define the proportion of just-cause types to contract around an employment-at-will
default to be "prop," then the costs of an employment-at-will-default would be:
l(prop)( aj) + 5(ajo- (prop)(cajc)),
while the cost ofajust-cause default would be:
1(oraw) + 5(0).
Substituting caj = 1 - ccaw, it is possible to show that an employment-at-will default will only be
efficient if the proportion of contractors who substantively prefer employment-at-will provisions is
greater than:
This critical supermajoritarian requirement equals 75% when prop = .5 and 82.1% when prop = .1.
Of course, if a sufficiently large proportion of contractors prefer employment at-will coverage, it
will be the more efficient default notwithstanding the propensity effect.
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costs of failing to contract in choosing to contract. Such failures to contract
will only be relevant in contexts were there is less than complete separation
(i.e., where 3i < ai) so that in equilibrium there will be some contracting
types who fail to contract around dispreferred defaults. In such circum-
stances, efficiency-minded lawmakers should, ceteris paribus, tend to favor
defaults which are preferred by parties who would experience higher costs of
failing to contract around dispreferred defaults. This is most likely to occur
in situations where private information, rather than transaction costs, is the
impediment to contracting around a dispreferred default. Because of the in-
evitable contractual inertia described above, choosing a default preferred by
parties with high costs of failing to contract (f) will, all other things equal,
reduce the costs from failing to contract. Even if the propensity of different
contracting types to contract around alternative defaults is the same, that
does not mean that the costs of failing to contract will be equal.
For example, let us consider again the question of at-will versus just-
cause employment defaults. A just-cause default-because of contractual
inertia-may create legal protection for wrongful discharge that, for a pro-
portion of the workforce, is redundant with independent reputational deter-
rence of such terminations. But there is no reason to think that the costs of
this inefficiency will be equal to the costs of the inefficiency that stems, un-
der an at-will default, from subjecting another portion of the work force
(working for employers with lower reputational constraints) to the harms of
unreviewable wrongful discharge. Arguments can be made that either ineffi-
ciency might be greater.45 Our point here is only to observe that because the
inefficiencies from failing to contract around the alternative defaults flow
from such different causes, it is unlikely that these failure-to-contract costs
will be approximately even.
For example, focusing now on the differences in costs of failing to con-
tract around, let us assume that the costs of private contracting, public con-
tracting and the propensity to contract around dispreferred defaults are the
same for just-cause Uc) and at-will (aw) defaults.46 Specifically, imagine
that caw = cjc = 1, eaw = ejc = 0 and that propaw = propj, = .5. Under these as-
sumptions, if the costs of failing to contract are higher for just-cause types
(who are subjected to underdeterrence) than for at-will types (who are sub-
jected to overdeterrence), then just cause will again be efficient even if only
a minority of contractors substantively prefer this protection. For example, if
we assume thatfaw = 5 butfi, = 10, then the just-cause default will be effi-
45. See generally J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employ-
ment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 869-96.
46. The assumption that the propensity of different contracting types to contract around dis-
preferred defaults is obviously at odds with our earlier argument that the at-wil default will be
relatively sticky-in the sense that a lower proportion of just-cause contractors would contract
around it. But we make this alternative assumption to focus on differences in thefis.
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cient even if as many as sixty-four percent of the contractors prefer at-will
treatment.
II. PENALTY DEFAULTS THAT FORCE PRIVATELY INFORMED CONTRACTORS
TO REVEAL THEIR "TYPE"
The point of the foregoing analysis is to demonstrate that there is a rich
set of efficiency rationales for minoritarian defaults that are independent of
using penalty defaults to induce contractors to reveal information about their
type. As emphasized in our original article, penalty defaults can be used to
induce three types of information forcing: (1) inducing the parties to provide
courts with better information about their intent (hence reducing the public
cost of gap-filling as with the zero-quantity default); (2) inducing one con-
tractor to correct another's mistaken beliefs about what the law is (as in the
previous discussion of just-cause defaults); and (3) inducing one contractor
to reveal private information about herself or some fact pertinent to the con-
tract (as in the suggestion that the Hadley rule might induce high-damage
millers to reveal their type).
Penalty defaults used to induce information about contractors' types are
a special case of a minoritarian default based on different propensities to
contract around. Private information about types can also give rise to differ-
ent propensities to expressly contract because bad types may be more likely
to contractually pool with good types in the shadow of some defaults. Our
original Hadley model was a striking example of the different propensities to
contract around.47 In our example, none of the good contract types opted out
of the expanded liability default, but all of the bad types (i.e., the high-cost
millers) were willing to contract around the limited liability default.48 In one
sense, the limited liability default is actually a kind of majoritarian rule be-
cause a majority of the contractors (the low-cost millers) would prefer it.
The limited liability rule nonetheless served as a striking departure from set-
ting defaults to minimize the costs of express contracting. In our simple
model, the limited damages default was more efficient than the expansive
damages default-not just despite, but because it induced more contracting.
The example showed that the benefits of information revelation could out-
weigh the costs of express contracting.
47. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9.
48. If we let the subscripts H and E denote the Hadley and expanded liability defaults, then
our original example assumed that 95% of contractors were good types (i.e., aH = .95, aE = .05) and
showed that there could be strikingly dissimilar propensities to contract around the two defaults. In
our initial example, PH = 0 and 3z = .05. Thus, 0% of good types contracted around their dis-
preferred expanded liability default, while 100% of bad types contracted around their dispreferred
Hadley default.
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Adler's insightful analysis focuses solely on penalty defaults geared to
the revelation of type information. His chief thesis concerns the ways that
good types can cross-subsidize the prices paid by bad types in pooling equi-
libria. Adler correctly sees that bad types may often receive a subsidized
price by pooling with-and hence, in the eyes of the other side, becoming
indistinguishable from-the good types. Bad types confronted with a pen-
alty default may be reluctant to contract around it in ways that distinguish
themselves from the good types because doing so may cause the bad types to
face higher, nonsubsidized prices. In an earlier article, we identified a simi-
lar reluctance to separate that was also based on the prospect that bad types
would have to pay substantially higher prices in a separating equilibrium.49
When one side has private information and the other side has market power,
separation may allow the side with market power to charge a supracompeti-
tive price. Adler correctly shows that reluctance to separate might not be
caused just by lack of market power, but also by a subsidization effect.
This descriptive subsidization insight leads Adler to two normative im-
plications: (1) penalty defaults are only efficient in a narrow set of circum-
stances; and (2) lawmakers will have great difficulty identifying whether
such circumstances exist. While we agree with the subsidization point, we
do not believe it points as strongly toward these normative conclusions.
First, consider the narrowing point. Showing that bad types will have a
reluctance to separate in a broader range of circumstances is different than
showing that penalty defaults cannot be efficient. Adler carefully avoids
making such a claim. When either the subsidization or the market-power
effect creates reluctance, bad types will need to choose between the cost of
sticking with the penalty default pool and the cost of higher prices if they
separate. More extreme penalties may be sufficient to induce separation.
Indeed, Adler's own model suggests that penalty defaults can still be most
efficient for some parameter values.5 0
Moreover, Adler's own analysis of "case invariant liquidated damages"
provides a valuable insight about what types of penalty defaults are most
likely to induce separation-that is, most likely to increase the propensity of
bad types to contract around.51 What Adler calls "case invariant liquidated
damages" are an example of "untailored majoritarian defaults." Unlike a
hypothetical rule which is tailored to give each contracting party the gapfill-
ing provisions that they would have wanted in this particular contract, an
untailored majoritarian default is selected to correspond to the desires of the
majority of contractors.52 It has long been understood that untailored ma-
49. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2.
50. See Adler, supra note 1, at 1570, 1582.
51. See id. at 1570-72, 1582.
52. See text accompanying notes 12-17 infra for problems with implementing majoritarian
rules. See also Ayres, supra note 18, at 14.
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joritarian rules act as penalty defaults with regard to the minority contract
types, but Adler shows that untailored defaults will not create the same cross-
subsidization and attendant separation reluctance that more tailored majori-
tarian rules create. Thus, Adler has not only identified an important problem
with implementing penalty defaults (his subsidization reluctance), he has
identified a way that lawmakers can mitigate the problem.
Instead of seeing Adler's analysis as a limitation on when penalty de-
faults are appropriate, we see this part of his analysis as an important argu-
ment in favor of untailored, relative to tailored, majoritarian defaults. Adler
seems to fight the constructive power of this insight. He correctly points out
that untailored rules can create some ancillary inefficiencies of their own, but
he overlooks that they can also reduce the cost of ex post judicial gapfilling
for those who do not contract expressly. We may prefer untailored to tai-
lored types of majoritarianism, not because we want to reduce the costs of ex
post gapfilling but because untailored rules induce more bad types to reveal
themselves and hence cause more efficient ex ante precaution taking. Law-
makers will often have a nondichotomous choice about how relatively tai-
lored or untailored they want to make a majoritarian default. This again re-
lates to our prior discussion of whether the defaults should be "rules" or
"standards." Choosing penalty defaults that on the margin are more untai-
lored or rule-like might promote information forcing while considering the
contraindicating factors that Adler emphasizes.
Thus, we continue to be attracted to the idea of a zero-lost-profits dam-
ages default as a remedy for buyer breaches.53 A zero-damages default cer-
tainly constitutes an untailored, one-size-fits-all default. For example, sellers
of a new automobile who have negotiated an unusually high price may be
reluctant to contract around this penalty default-not because of a cross-
subsidization reluctance, but because of a market-power reluctance. Con-
sumers informed that they are about to sign a high-markup contract might
think better of it and continue haggling at this dealership or others. The
high-profit sellers might respond to a zero-lost profit default by merely con-
tracting for a liquidated amount that was small enough not to distinguish the
sale from other sales with more normal profits. But even here, the law could
make progress by taking more seriously the implicit representations of fact
that are made when parties contract around defaults.
In using penalty defaults to induce parties to reveal type information, the
law intends that by contracting around, one side or the other will implicitly
represent information about the profferor's type. Since parties implicitly
covenant that their implicit representation will be true, an attempt to contract
around a zero-damage default with a liquidated damages clause which sub-
53. See Ayers & Gertner, supra note 12, at 99 n.57; see also Ian Ayres, Three Proposals To
Harness Private Information in Contract, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 135 (1997).
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stantially understates one's true damages may constitute an implicit misrep-
resentation of fact. The law might require liquidated damage defaults to be
enforceable to accurately state the lost profit of the defendant--or might
even hold sellers liable (for breaching their implicit warranty that all implicit
representations are true) for negotiating clauses with underliquidated
amounts that were not so denominated. Under such a system, sellers with
private information that the contract price is exorbitant might still be reluc-
tant to expressly contract for any liquidated damages-but failing to do so
might also send a positive message to a potential buyer.
We are more attracted to the second normative implication-namely that
it will often be difficult for lawmakers to know whether a penalty default will
be efficient. Indeed, we argued this point ourselves with regard to separation
reluctance caused by market power. We agree with Adler that penalty de-
faults can go badly wrong if they're ineffective in inducing separation. In
efficiency terms, it may be better to have the parties pool around a tailored
hypothetical damages default rather than to pool around a substantively inef-
ficient penalty default. And we agree with Adler that courts and other law-
makers will often lack crucial information in order to determine beforehand
whether a particular penalty will be effective in inducing separation. But
Adler ignores that policymakers can often assess after the fact whether a
particular penalty is effective in inducing separation. If diverse contractual
types continue to pool in the shadow of a penalty default, lawmakers could
experiment with a more severe untailored penalty or revert to a majoritarian-
based default. For example, both the Hadley and Empire54 defaults seem to
have succeeded in inducing at least partial separation. It is a usual practice
of common carriers to offer a menu of differently-priced damages for delays.
A shipper's choice of such an insurance contract allows for significant sepa-
ration.5 5 Ex ante assessment is often not possible, but ex post assessment
may be sufficient to warrant experimentation with penalty defaults.
At the end of the day, lawmakers with imperfect information must stand
ready to decide gapfilling questions. While Adler never takes a substantive
position on how the courts should have decided Hadley and Empire, we bet
that he is in favor of the defaults that give bad types a larger incentive to
contract around. We also bet that Adler favors the law of mistake, which
also has penalty-default, type-forcing quality. For example, section 153 of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts allows a contractor who is unilaterally
mistaken about a basic assumption to void a contract if "the other party had
reason to know of the mistake. ' 56 The default possibility of voidability is a
54. Empire Volkswagen v. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 814 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
55. Of course, lawmakers might observe some separation under a penalty default but still may
not be able to assess whether the separation is sufficiently complete. But Adler's central worry, that
the parties will not separate at all in equilibrium, is often easily knowable after the fact.
56. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1979).
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penalty that the informed contractor can only avoid by revealing information.
Indeed, in a Hadley-like fact pattern, a carrier could argue that a basic as-
sumption of its promise to perform or pay damages was the belief that the
miller would only have foreseeably low damages. Any evidence that the
miller knew that it had high damages, but failed to correct the carrier's mis-
taken assumption, might be grounds for voiding the carrier's duty to pay
damages at all.57 A slightly expanded reading of the common law of mistake
thus can be seen as a penalty default to induce knowledgeable contractors to
correct the other side's mistakes of law or fact. Of course, Adlerian reluc-
tance may induce bad types to remain silent here as well, but the more severe
and untailored penalty of voidability-with possible forfeitures, instead of
merely limited damages-may be sufficient to induce separating disclosure.
The modem law of unconscionability may also be seen as a penalty de-
fault to induce an informed party to disclose and explain information-not
just about the terms of the contract but about facts pertinent to its perform-
ance. Building on the notion that it is procedurally unconscionable for a
promissor to be unfairly surprised by the terms of the contracts, courts are
beginning to impose a duty to disclose facts pertinent to the other side's per-
formance. For example, Langemeier v. National Oats Co.58 concerned a
plaintiff/agronomist who agreed to sell popcorn to defendant. The defendant
(who also had provided the plaintiff with the popcorn seed) had failed to ex-
plain to the plaintiff (who had never grown popcorn before) that popcorn
needed to dry twenty days in the field after maturing. When the popcom
crop was badly damaged by freezing weather, the Eighth Circuit set aside the
contract because of the defendant's nondisclosure. Our unconscionability
can be interpreted as the type of penalty default which Adler criticizes be-
cause failure to disclose information about the probability of nonperformance
or the consequences of nonperformance can lead to the penalty of nonen-
forcement. Type-forcing penalty defaults are not a radical departure from
existing contract rules. Rather, aspects of existing mistakes and unconscion-
ability law (as well as the venerable Hadley rule itself) are consistent with
the notion that contract law can beneficially induce more separation by pe-
nalizing informed parties who fail to disclose pertinent information to the
other side of the agreement.
57. See also id. § 161(c) ("A person's nondisclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an
assertion that the fact does not exist... where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a
mistake of the other party... ."); id. § 201(2)(a) ("Where the parties have attached different mean-
ings to a promise ... it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached by one of them if...
that party did not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other knew the
meaning attached by the first party .. .
58. 775 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 51:15911610
HeinOnline -- 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1610 1998-1999
AYRES & GERTNER RESPONSE
CONCLUSION
The first generation of default theorists had a simple and elegant theory
of default choice: Contractual gaps should be filled with the hypothetical
term that most contractors would have wanted. This majoritarian standard
has great appeal and, other things being equal, we wholeheartedly support it.
The only problem is that other things are not always equal. In this essay, we
have identified five other aphorisms that are equally valid. Ceteris paribus,
efficiency-minded lawmakers should favor defaults that:
(1) impose lower costs of public gap filling;
(2) produce higher positive externalities;
(3) have higher costs of express contracting;
(4) are preferred by those with lower propensities of contracting around other
rules; or
(5) are preferred by those with higher costs of failing to contract around other
rules.
We sketched possible scenarios where these principles could trump the ma-
joritarian impulse---causing defaults substantively preferred by only a mi-
nority of contractors to be efficient.
Adler's fine contribution is consistent with our major thrust that the
"majoritarian" or "hypothetical" approach to default choice is insufficient to
assure efficiency. Adler's demonstration of the reluctance effect further dis-
credits any simple-minded notion that majoritarian defaults will merely in-
duce minorities to contract efficiently for alternative provisions. Rather, in
Adler's analysis, the choice about whether separation occurs is largely inde-
pendent of a simple-minded analysis of transaction costs. Adler is also the
first to see that untailored defaults may be more effective at inducing separa-
tion than tailored defaults because they do not give rise to the subsidization
reluctance that may induce inefficient pooling when tailored defaults are
used. His analysis suggests that an untailored default may be more effective
at information forcing than tailored defaults. Again, these are considerations
far removed from simple majoritarian impulse.
While we have tried to undermine majoritarianism by identifying com-
peting impulses, it is also important to emphasize that the majoritarian ap-
proach can also be criticized as being conceptually incomplete. A majori-
tarian rule derives from determining what similarly-situated parties would
have contracted for. But what defines "similarly-situated?" In the Hadley
example, it might mean buyers and sellers generally, or it might mean ship-
pers and carriers generally, or it might mean millers and carriers, or it might
mean millers with high lost profits from delay, or it might mean very risk-
averse millers and risk-neutral carriers. Models of default rules (ours in-
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cluded) largely ignore this question by assuming a well-defined set of con-
tractual interactions for analysis.5 9
A second problem in defining the majoritarian rule is to identify the in-
formation structure for the hypothetical contract. Easterbrook and Fischel
argue that a court ought to apply the "term that the parties would have se-
lected with full information and costless contracting. '60 This rule is prob-
lematic when parties do not contract around the default. Private information
may not be revealed in the contracting process, so that the other party's ac-
tions can not be affected by the information. 61 The full information contract
may be quite inefficient ex post if, as in the Hadley example, a carrier fails to
take extra precautions since it did not know how costly delays would be to
the miller. Finally, lawmakers have difficulty divining what the majority of
contractors want. Because of inertia, a majority of contractors may fail to
contract around a variety of defaults. And, because of heterogeneity, a ma-
joritarian default may not even exist-there may only be a plurality default.
In an earlier draft, Adler concluded that a judge or legislator should be
"skeptical of her ability to establish an efficient penalty-default rule" and
instead should more often trust her instincts "to provide a traditional tailored
default rule, the rule she believes the parties before her would have chosen
had they contemplated the contingency presented. '62 Here, Adler is going
further than merely arguing that lawmakers should presumptively set (untai-
lored) majoritarian rules. He seems to be suggesting that judges should pre-
sumptively set the default to be the more (tailored) hypothetical rules that
individual contractors "before her would have chosen." We disagree. While
Adler's final version no longer suggests any presumption in favor of tailored
hypothetical defaults, we worry that readers will mistakenly conclude that
any "criticism" of penalty default theory amounts to an endorsement of (un-
tailored) majoritarian or (tailored) hypothetical defaults. Such a conclusion
is unwarranted. While a lawmaker's task is difficult and skepticism about
setting penalty defaults is often warranted, we simultaneously are skeptical
that judges have sufficient information to identify tailored hypothetical pro-
59. Chamy refers to this as the dimension of generality:
For example the adjudicator deciding whether employment is at will might conduct a de-
tailed investigation into the understandings of the particular worker and employer involved
in the dispute. Alternatively, she might simply announce a construction of the hypothetical
bargain based on a generalization about all firms and workers and applicable to all such
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visions. Adler's analysis could reasonably lead readers toward agnosticism
about default choice. Lawmakers will often not have sufficient information
to choose the efficient default. But it is surprising that Adler (at least in a
previous draft) preferred tailored, hypothetical defaults when his model sug-
gests that untailored majoritarian rules will be less subject to the inefficient
pooling which he has admirably identified. In short, skepticism about
judges' abilities to tailor is at least as warranted as skepticism about judges'
abilities to set efficient penalties.
The determination of the efficient default requires a careful analysis of
the contracting environment starting with an understanding of the underlying
causes of contractual incompleteness and a determination of the impact of
different default rules on the contracting process. Adler's theoretical models,
as well as our own and others, help us understand what the elements of that
analysis should include. These reductive models can highlight unnoticed
possibilities-such as the possibility that minoritarian defaults might be effi-
cient. But these models are not useful for proving impossibilities. Adler's
subsidization reluctance may narrow the range of circumstances where pen-
alty defaults are efficient, but to show that penalty defaults and other mi-
noritarian defaults are unlikely to be inefficient requires richer information
about the world.
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